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ABSTRACT: In this paper, we will briefly audit how the phenomenon of the Anthropocene has 
taken over what F.W.J. Schelling at the end of the Eighteenth century (1775-1854) described as 
the state of original duplicity that defines the relation between nature and the organism, an 
indifferent relation that must not be canceled, otherwise the former will have attained permanent 
rest. In his second major Naturphilosophie, First Outline of A System of the Philosophy of Nature, 
Schelling presciently established the ‘problem’ that we face today in the anthropogenic age 
which, as he put it, is ‘not to explain the active in Nature ... but the resting, permanent.’ The 
Anthropocene not only cancels the indifferent relation between nature and the organism, but 
also reverses the problem of Nature philosophy into explaining the ‘active’, that is, by the potency 
of willing. But willing mistakes ‘activity’ for ‘permanence’ which cancels the reciprocal 
indifference to produce an absolute coincidence that is equal to 0. Schelling directs the problem 
of Nature philosophy to a maximal or tautegorical reading of nature whose relation to the 
organism, through its denial of all permanence, creates a dual external world that sustains life as 
we know it. In general, this reveals the basis for Schelling’s critique of subjective idealism, and 
the philosophical tradition of dialectical mediation, that seeks an absolute coincidence between 
Nature and Man from the pure subjective side of the equation, leaving the objective side of 
Nature dead and motionless. Needless to say, this ‘absolute coincidence’ is now the epitome of 
the anthropogenic era of carbon-based climate change.  
KEYWORDS: Anthropocene; Dual extensity; Daniel Whistler; F.W.J. Schelling; Geocybernetics; 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the face of an impending climate regime change, a provocative article has 
come out recently urging the authorities of the International Commission on 
Stratigraphy (ICS), who will vote to decide whether the Anthropocene is the right 
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concept to define the new geological turn in the Earth’s history, to stop worrying 
about an official name change.1 Incidentally, the article’s tone is unwittingly 
Hegelian or dialectical, to say the least:  
The ICS can answer that question at some future point. But, we should keep in 
mind that there is no ‘right’ answer to the question. Whichever way the vote 
ultimately goes, we are left with anthropogenic climate change and despeciation 
and other real environmental problems. So, while we wait for the ICS to vote, let’s 
put aside the grand gesture of trying to reconceptualize human and geological 
history. Let’s give up the fanciful expectation that changing a geological name will 
provide the impetus for environmental action. (LNA 37) 
The ‘Hegelian’ in the above pronouncements concerns two ‘dialectical’ 
indicators that the article endorses on the sidelines: 1) its refusal of presentation 
or exhibition of nature according to its most literal sense, and 2) its denialism of 
the positive sense of this kind of literal presentation through which, as Daniel 
Whistler has argued recently, “the scandal of Naturphilosophie is lost.”2 As a good 
Schellingian, Whistler defends the idea of reading nature literally, that is, 
tautegorically speaking, arguing from Schelling’s mode of presentation of nature 
‘according to its very letter’. As he argues, “it is Schelling who in his Lectures on the 
Philosophy of  Mythology sets out a mode of reading, based on the concept of 
tautegory, that remains resolutely literalistic” (NL 126). The whole idea is that 
Naturphilosophie does not read and/or present nature allegorically or 
hermeneutically (NL, 132), extracting a hidden meaning behind the appearances 
of things, but rather, as in itself the “unity of  sense and being, content and form.”3  
This suggests a literal reading of nature as nature exhibits itself in the most 
tautegorical sense possible, which means the presentation of the inherence of its 
meaning in its exhibitedness as being. This also echoes Iain Hamilton Grant’s 
interpretation of the copula, for instance, adjusted into the tautegorical 
explanation of nature. In an earlier essay Grant asserts:  
 
1 See Jay Foster, “Let’s not talk about the Anthropocene,” Analecta Hermeneutica, vol. 10, 2018, p. 37. 
Henceforth, LNA.  
2 Daniel Whistler, “The New Literalism: Reading Schelling After Grant,” Symposium, vol. 19, no. 1, 2015, p. 
129. Hereafter cited as NL.  
3 See also Gabriel Markus, “The Mythological Being of Reflection: An Essay on Hegel, Schelling and the 
Contingency of Necessity,” in Markus Gabriel and Slavoj Zizek, Mythology, Madness, and Laughter: Subjectivity 
in German Idealism, London, Continuum, 2009, p. 61; see also NL 134. 
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The ‘copula [Band]’ that couples mind and nature cannot coherently be thought if 
the former is the ground of the latter, since then we have ‘no inkling of what nature 
is.’ Nor can nature simply be placed ‘outside me’ without rendering its passage into 
me incomprehensible...The copula then articulates antecedent and consequent 
precisely as natural history just when mind is grounded not in itself but in a subject 
antecedent to mind, or in the subject of nature itself.4  
As the mind’s most essential substrate, the ‘sense’ of nature is ‘being’ itself, the 
sense that nature exhibits in its logical positedness. In its exhibitedness as such, 
“no foreign power can interfere with it.”5 This is a kind of maximal naturalism 
that takes nature as it is. For Schelling, it was Aristotle who first comprehended 
this logic:”[J]ust as there is a path from the logical to the empirical, there is also 
a path from the empirical to the logical that arrives at the innate and indwelling 
logic of nature.”6 This kind of presenting nature, however, has had ever since a 
bad press. The antipathy to Naturphilosophie always concerns the scandal it 
throws in our “ethical experience of the world,”7 whereby, as in Hegel’s dense 
rendition as follows, “the sublation of existence is no longer necessary,” and where 
existence is understood no longer in “the form of being-in-itself -- neither still in 
the original form [of an abstract concept]... but is now the recollected in-itself, ready 
for conversion into the form of being-for-itself” (PS 17). Hegel’s oblique part in the 
bad reception of Naturephilosophy echoes here the recent exhortation to stop 
talking about the Anthropocene.  
As a plea to pragmatism and ethical realism, ‘Let’s not talk about the 
Anthropocene’ broadly suggests putting the Anthropocene in the backburner, 
and by implication, alongside many other conceptual idioms or figurative 
representations, whether it is Chthulucene or Capitalocene,8 fossil capitalism, etc. 
 
4 Iain Hamilton Grant, “The Hypothesis of Nature’s Logic in Schelling’s Naturphilosophie,” in Palgrave 
Handbook of German Idealism, ed. Matthew C. Altman, New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 492. 
Henceforth, HNL.  
5 F.W.J. Schelling, First Outline of A System of the Philosophy of Nature, trans. Keith R. Peterson, New York: State 
University of New York Press, Albany, 2004, p. 17. Hereafter cited as FO. 
6 F.W.J. Schelling, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy: The Berlin Lectures, trans. Bruce Matthews, New 
York: State University of New York Press, 2007, p. 161.  Henceforth cited as GPP. 
7 G.W.F Hegel, Phenomenology of the Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 215. 
Henceforth, PS. 
8 See Donna J. Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene, Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2016, p. 2. Henceforth, ST. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 320 
 
(LNA 1-2). But by doing so, the article unwittingly defends the taken-for-granted 
superiority of technoscientific narrative focused on “mitigating, remediating and 
adapting to changes in the Earth system” (LNA 37). This is the dominant face of 
the Anthropocene, what the Hegelian finality of sublation would have echoed in 
an oblique sense, which refers to a completed order of the movement of the 
whole. No more sublation is necessary in light of the elements of, or rather, the 
forms through which the whole itself progresses until it attains a sense of 
completion as a whole-for-itself. Thus, as Hegel declares, “what remains to be 
done, and what requires a higher level of cultural reorientation, is to represent 
and to get acquainted with these forms” (PS 17). This is the ethical realism that 
comes at the end of sublation.  
In Hegelian terms, the Anthropocene requires a higher awareness of the 
forms that make up this present mode of nature’s activity, or those forms of 
knowledge (scientific and historical) that have over time converted our idea of 
nature as a whole-for-itself, which may help us gain technical proficiency and 
spread it through the wider cultural spectrum (‘what remains to be done’) to 
reverse its destructive ecological effects and, seemingly, irreversible humanitarian 
costs. In short, the Anthropocene possesses its own logic of recovery. But this also 
amounts to saying that the Anthropocene requires no more sublation of its 
existence in the sense that it is an irreversible phenomenon.  
A passage from Phenomenology of  Spirit (PS 18) in which Hegel parlays about 
the theory of substance (originally from Spinoza) may reveal this connection: 
“[Its]existence has thus merely passed over into figurative representation. At the same 
time it is thus something familiar, something which the existent Spirit is finished 
and done with, so that it is no longer active or really interested in it.” In the end, 
as we might extend this connection to some of the figurative expressions that 
surround nature’s activity as it unfolds in the present, its ‘existence’ may only be 
interrogated on the level of self-positing, in relation to the Hegelian formula that 
“Substance shows itself essentially to be Subject” (ibid., p. 21). As might be 
expected of a substance, it is no longer interested in interrogating its existence, 
whether as a phenomenon the Anthropocene, for that matter, is still an 
indeterminate or immediate form of existence that requires sublation to render 
itself determinable to consciousness, and thus, determinable to knowledge or 
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science, any more than, as a whole-for-itself that it has come to be, the only 
necessary approach that it would gain to essay from is to recollect the historical 
forms, and other synthetic approaches to nature that have culminated in the 
present ecological predicament. What remains to be done is that the ethical 
comprehension of its existence must rather be “directed against the 
representation thus formed” (ibid., p. 21), implicating here the figurative 
representations of the phenomenon in question as “only the movement of the 
particular Spirit” (ibid.), and therefore, still not “the activity of the universal self ” 
(ibid., 18).  Suffice it to say the Spirit can still be alienated from itself, owing to its 
connection to experience, but then, after realizing the abstract immediacy of 
experience, “returns to itself from this alienation” (ibid., 21).  
Returning to the article ‘Let’s not talk about the Anthropocene, the author 
suggests that, apart from the non-utility of official name change, the ecological 
crisis we confront as a species involves the absence of real ‘awareness’ of the actual 
problem itself that many have echoed in recent years. In a manner of speaking, 
our awareness of ecological emergency is still alienated from itself. Stacy Alaimo, 
for instance, complained in her book that, “while the temporal and geographic 
scale of the anthropocene is vast, the scale of human responses to environmental 
catastrophe is often minute.”9 ‘Let’s not talk about the Anthropocene’, however, 
does not see the Anthropocene, or any other idiom of exhibited nature today, 
through the everyday prism of people’s experience of ecological uncertainty, a 
phenomenon that is as much metaphorical as real and concrete.10 Arguably, it 
does not see the subjects of the Anthropocene, as Alaimo would venture to 
express, as people who “engage,” for instance, “in both ordinary and 
extraordinary practices, both private, quotidian improvisations” (EE 2), beyond 
the global narrative of mitigation and adaptation. These practices include among 
others, “naked protesting, marine conservation, plastic activism, and the 
scientific and popular encounters with ‘queer’ animals”(ibid.). Not unexpectedly, 
they express a kind of ethical grounding outside of the dominant narrative of the 
 
9 Stacy Alaimo, Exposed: Environmental Politics and Pleasures in Posthuman Times, Minneapolis, London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2016, p. 2. Henceforth, EE. 
10 See Bruno Latour “Agency at the time of the Anthropocene,” in New Literary History, vol. 45, 2014, p. 15. 
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Anthropocene.11 In her 2015 book, Donna Haraway gives us a presentation of the 
Anthropocene in the region of this ethical grounding: “These times called the 
Anthropocene are times of multi-species, including human, urgency; of great 
mass death and extinction; of onrushing disasters whose unpredictable 
specificities are foolishly taken as unknowability itself; of refusing to know and to 
cultivate the capacity of response-ability; of refusing to be present in and to 
onrushing catastrophe in time; of unprecedented looking away” (ST 39). Haraway 
labels this ethical grounding as ‘art science activism’. Nonetheless, in strict 
Hegelian terms, this kind of thinking may qualify as “casual philosophizing that 
fastens on to this or that object, relationship, or thought that happens to pop up 
in the imperfect consciousness, or tries to base the truth on the pros and cons, the 
inferences and consequences, of rigidly defined thoughts”(PS 20).  
A Naturphilosophie scandal otherwise calls for a similar kind of ethical 
grounding which Schelling developed into a new philosophical syntax involving 
the co-implication of aesthetics and science, of philosophy of art and philosophy 
of nature, that Schelling weaponized against the economic telos of his time.12 As 
Arran Gare echoes a similar point, this kind of activism was a “revolution called 
for by [Schelling] at the end of the Eighteenth Century in his effort to .... make 
life and mind intelligible.”13 This activism is not based upon unknowability, rather 
on the very knowable sense of the crisis (notwithstanding the paradoxical nature 
of the crisis as unsublated that we will try to unpack later) that the Anthropocene 
rather presents in two negative inflections: 1) the present lack of ‘positive’ 
attention to nature as subject, and 2) the strong impulse of techno-logical reason 
today that tends to ignore the principle of non-coincidence of nature with its 
 
11 See for instance Drew Dalton (2016) for a discussion of the possibility of attaining “absolute ethical and 
political values” modeled on a deeper understanding of nature, that is to say, “without inadvertently slipping 
into ‘smug nihilism’ or establishing a new some form of fanatic dogmatic metaphysics” (Drew M. Dalton, 
“On the Possibility of Speculative Ethical Absolutes After Kant: Returning to Schelling through the Frailties 
of Meillassoux and Badiou,” Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, vol. 21, no. 4, 2016, p. 171). 
12 Or, the “economic-teleological principle” (see F.W.J. Schelling, Statement on the True Relationship of the 
Philosophy of Nature to the Revised Fichtean Doctrine, trans. Dale E. Snow, New York: State University of New 
York Press, Albany, 2018, p. 13. Henceforth cited as STR). 
13 Arran Gare, ‘Biosemiosis and Causation: Defending Biosemiosis through Rosen’s Theoretical Biology or 
Integrating Biosemiotics and Anticipatory Systems’ Theory,’ Cosmos and History: Journal of Natural and Social 
Philosophy, vol. 15, no. 1, 2019, p. 34. Henceforth cited as BC. 
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products, or the asymmetry of nature and intelligence.14  
The Anthropocene had been, in fact, already at work in previous histories, 
not just at the beginning of the industrial revolution, but further back, in the 
epoch-making time of humanity struggling with the resilience of the mythical 
past. We are referring here to the scientific confrontation with mythology in terms 
of interpreting it with the purpose of ‘painting its grey grey’; in Hegelese, to make 
it known as past, which means, “it cannot be rejuvenated.”15 Schelling, by 
contrast, had the scientific truth carry the stigma of blasphemy, and 
irreligiousness, when he speaks of mythology as follows: “There is truth in 
mythology, but not in mythology as such. The mythological is: 1) either a mere form, 
disguise of a) a historic truth, b) of a physical truth; or 2) misunderstanding, distortion, 
a) of a purely scientific (essentially irreligious) truth, b) of a religious truth.”16 The 
scientific assault against the purely religious truth of mythology constitutes the act 
of sublating the past in terms of an epistemic reduction, its knowability as an 
historical past, and thus, deprived of its character as myth, all the more its 
capability to foment a crisis of thought, meaning, and interpretation through its 
resistance to allegory and scientific interpretation. The scientific interpretation of 
myths aims at destroying the capability of mythology to found and disperse a 
people. As Jason M. Wirth argues in a foreword to the translation of Schelling’s 
Lectures on the Philosophy of  Mythology: “Mythology is not a human invention… 
Mythology founds a people (and the dispersion of humankind into peoples is the 
dispersion inherent within mythology itself). It belongs to the ground of the 
multiplication of languages.”17 By divesting mythology of its people for whom 
mythology meant nothing else beyond what they thought and expressed, a 
scientific study of mythology, under the grounding science of philosophical 
investigation, reduces these people to their roles as precursors of philosophical 
thinking; their “philosophemes” are, therefore, to be understood as the (scientific) 
 
14 The co-identity of Nature and Mind is basically informed by the asymmetry of the relation, i.e., the 
production of their identity is “unthinkable without an original diremption in Nature” (FO 205). 
15 G.W.F. Hegel., “Preface,” Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008, p. 16. 
16 F.W.J. Schelling, Historical-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology, trans. Mason Richey and Markus 
Zisselsberger, New York: State University of New York Press, Albany, 2007, p. 149. Henceforth, PM. 
17 Jason M. Wirth, “Foreword,” Historical-Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology, p. xi. 
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“content of mythology” (PM 25-26). The myths are transformed into objects of 
philosophical study, stripped of their capability to disperse a mode of narration 
into multiple languages, into actual peoples, by imposing a linear continuity of 
mythical expression with the historical belief of the present, the belief in the 
indeterminacy of the past so that it can be sublated, once again, into the 
‘movement of the whole’.   
The same applies to the technoscientific narrative behind the present 
ecological predicament. Nature is deprived of subjectivity as the source of its own 
productive cause and generation, thus, the asymmetry between itself  and intelligence is 
lost. Nature is stripped of its tautegorical sense, its literal sense as original duplicity 
in the sense that it allows its products to have a “dual external world” (FO 107), 
namely, that the organism is external to nature where it properly belongs, albeit, 
‘snatched’ from it (ibid., p. 112), at the same time that its presentation as an 
organism for itself is external to the power that had borne it, which means that it 
presents itself externally to nature. This dual external worlding paradoxically 
makes the activity possible between nature and the organism: “All activity in 
Nature takes place only on the border of two worlds” (ibid., p. 107). If 
technoscience, the whole scientific rationality of the 21st century, disallows nature 
to present itself in this way, i.e., in its original duplicity, it only proves how much 
has remained unchanged since the post-mythological rise of early scientific 
reasoning.  
THE SCANDAL OF NATURE 
Technoscientific rationality is the face of the Anthropocene that prevents the 
external world to seek its independent presentation in real world crisis, thus, 
preempts the possibility of presentation that brings out a scandal. This scandal 
can be formulated as that through which  Naturphilosophie’s exposition of 
knowledge in general is totally extrinsic to nature. This is challenged by many 
other factors, like human-induced climate change which cancels the border 
between two worlds, the external world itself and the externality of the organism 
vis-à-vis its life-giving source. (I will take up this point later). As Schelling 
reiterates, “that boundary can never be canceled in the organism as long as it is 
an organism” (FO 107). Roughly speaking, this dual extensity is the scandal of 
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nature.  
The scandal of Naturphilosophie conveys the tautegorical sense of this dual 
external world, which means that the organism is only external from the 
standpoint of original duplicity. These external worlds are truly identical, 
provided they constitute an asymmetrical relation. This asymmetry is sustained 
by the activity that the boundary affords to the organism. The boundary places 
the organism as object of nature, but at the same time is an object to itself, as a 
subject capable of self-grounding and ‘self-causing’ activity (BC 58), but only from 
the position of deducing, as an incomplete finite, an infinite substrate. This means 
that it is itself an infinite, even so, an infinite that reflects the absolute inhibition 
of nature in the sense that nature originally contains a “negative force,” an 
“original involution … that hinders it from reaching its end” (FO 77). This is to 
say that an incomplete finite cannot aspire for infinity that is already in itself 
inhibited from the beginning never to reach its end. What the organism can 
aspire to, at the very least, is to sustain its indifference to that infinity which is also 
indifferent to it. Schelling argues: “By virtue of the reciprocal restriction of these 
forces no absolute evolution will occur in any given moment (of time)” (ibid., p. 187). 
In an absolute evolution, i.e., an evolution unrestricted by a negative force, 
“nothing would be distinguishable … no moment of time would be filled in a 
determinate way” (ibid.). 
But how is this mutual indifference related to the Anthropocene, the 
predominant mode of presenting nature? We contend that the Anthropocene is a 
boundary concept in the sense that it replaces the boundary that sustains the 
organism’s dual external world with a concept almost similar to an absolute takeover 
in the sense that either Nature or Man finally “undertakes to carry out the 
[singular] construction of a finite product,” which, as Schelling asserts, cannot 
but culminate “at one and the same point” (ibid., p. 17), thus, following Schelling, 
the absolute coincidence of Nature and Man, Nature = Man. (This will exactly be 
the case once it is decided that the Anthropocene represents the finite 
achievement of our epistemic quest for self-definition). We propose that the terms 
Nature and Man are rather mutually but only negatively at odds, that is, 
reciprocally motivated. The Anthropocene is the [natural] scene of Man, where 
Nature is functionally enjoined in the overall constitutive anthropogenic effects 
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on the Earth’s system, and where Man sees this Nature thereof as a product. 
Overall, nature cannot be studied as a subject of its own production. In this 
negative double bind, a constricted reciprocation of effects between Nature (as an 
unnaturally contrived object) and Man (as naturalized subject) is artificially 
conceived. But, as Schelling contends, “if we let both coincide at one and the 
same point, then their effects toward one another will reciprocally be canceled, 
and the product will be = to 0” (ibid., p. 17). This will mean extinction. (That is 
why we cannot stop ‘talking about the Anthropocene’). 
This apprehension somehow resonates in a recent publication, “The Geo-
Politics of the Anthropocene: Using Stratigraphy to Naturalize the Anthropocene as a 
Formal Geological Unit,” where the following conclusion is drawn:  
The Anthropocene concept clearly would be harmed if stratigraphers rejected it as 
having no scientific merit. But … the Anthropocene concept might also be harmed 
if it were endorsed, since such an endorsement would require adjusting existing 
stratigraphic standards.18  
The above observation suggests that as long as we are not yet officially in the 
Anthropocene, the absolute takeover (by Nature = Man) is still a remote 
possibility. Yet it also reveals the extent to which the exposition of nature in its 
predominant mode at present does not allow a scandal to disrupt the equation of 
Nature and Man in the sense that it preserves the negativity of the concept that 
defines their relation (nature and man) just so to keep the relation 
uncomprehended, i.e., without a natural substrate from which a deduction such 
as this relation can be derived. The negativity of the concept (in terms of the 
current mode of Nature presentation) only allows for technical interpretation for 
which any sign of extinction-bearing thought, what Schelling defines as 
‘unprethinkable’, “that before which reason itself bows down” (GPP 202), is 
deemed beforehand as unthinkable and meaningless, scandalous to scientific 
knowledge, for that matter, due to its propensity to spoil the equation Nature = 
Man. This equation is taken strictly from the side of subjectivity, thus, reducing 
it to the potency of the human will. 
 
18 See Jeni Barton, “The Geo-Politics of the Anthropocene: Using Stratigraphy to Naturalize the 
Anthropocene as a Formal Geological Unit,” Analecta Hermeneutica, vol. 10, 2018, p.27.    
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THE ANTHROPOCENE AS A BOUNDARY CONCEPT 
From the latest report of climate science, nature and man at least coincide at 
several critical points. These are called ‘planetary boundaries’, which concept, as 
the authors introduced, is intended to identify “a safe operating space for 
humanity with respect to the functioning of the Earth system.”19 These planetary 
boundaries are: 1) C02 concentration in the atmosphere, 2) stratospheric ozone, 
3) Global Phosphorus and Nitrogen Cycles, 4) biogeochemical nitrogen due to 
industrial activities, 5) global freshwater use, 6) land system change, 7) loss of 
biological diversity, 8) chemical pollution, and 9) atmospheric aerosol loading” 
(PB 32). Three of which, “human interference with the global nitrogen cycle,” 
“climate boundary” (greenhouse gas emissions), and “boundaries for freshwater 
use and land-system change,” have already been “transgressed by humanity” 
(ibid.). 
Because all boundaries will soon be crossed, no matter how we wish to avoid 
the inescapable, the shifting of planetary gear is somehow inevitable – to look 
behind, and, if possible, never look forward. This apprehension is echoed by a 
science paper published in 2015: “Averting a dramatic decay of biodiversity and 
the subsequent loss of ecosystem services is still possible through intensified 
conservation efforts, but that window of opportunity is rapidly closing.”20 The 
necessity to look back is cast in stone, a necessity embedded in the structure of 
reality. Schelling once said: “The entire world, so to speak, lies caught in reason, 
but the question is: How did it come into this net?.”21 Schelling pushed the 
subject-matter farther: “Therefore there is still in the world something Other and 
something more than mere reason - even something that strives beyond these 
boundaries.)” (AW 134). The most unwelcome fact is that everything is bound to 
strive beyond boundaries. The crossing of planetary boundaries, mentioned 
above, however, also tells us something oddly concrete - something can be 
“overcome, but not annihilated” (ibid., p. 106). As Schelling would affirm in the 
 
19 J. Rockström, et. al., “Planetary Boundaries,” Ecology and Society, vol. 14, no. 2, 2009, p. 32. Henceforth, 
PB. 
20 See Ceballos, et al., “Accelerated Modern Human-Induced Species Losses: Entering the Sixth Mass 
Extinction,” in Science Advances, vol. 1, no. 5, 2015: e1400253. 
21 See Jason M. Wirth, “Notes to Translator’s Introduction,” in The Ages of the World (third version), New York: 
State University of New York Press, 2000, p. 134, n. 15. Schelling’s Ages of the World is hereafter cited as AW. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 328 
 
midst of the desolation of his time:  
How charitable it is to know a principle amid the motility and slackness of thinking 
that is neither to be dissolved by the menstruum22 of the sharpest concept not to go 
up in smoke in the fire of spiritual thinking! Without this principle which resists 
thinking, the world would actually already be dissolved into nothing. (ibid, p. 107) 
Just as Schelling witnessed in his time the ‘simultaneous movement’ of 
Enlightenment and the barbarism of destructive beauty (in the works of art, for 
instance), it may be worth considering today the co-incidental phenomena of 
technoscientific rationality and the persistence of the barbaric principle, urging a 
positive return to the dual external world that the Anthropocene has destroyed 
with its planetary boundary crossings.23 But the Anthropocene, at least, on 
account of its unilluminated side, possesses a blind, withdrawn, barbaric nature, 
simultaneous to the dominant global forging of knowing-dependent future. 
Suffice it to say, the Anthropocene is not yet in its full essence a present reality, 
not because the authorities have yet to decide on the ‘term’ to represent our 
geological era, but rather because, paradoxically speaking, it “presupposes the 
 
22 Wirth annotates this passage with a definition of menstruum: “In alchemy, the menstruum was the solvent by 
which one transfigured something into gold. It was the so-called ‘philosopher's stone’ of which gold was a 
degradation and lead was an even further degradation. It was pure prime matter, Schelling's so-called ‘gold 
of gold’” (AW 148, n. 119). 
23 For Schelling, the aesthetic judgment, which for Kant must be given over at the end to teleological 
judgment, reveals the sources of the will’s indeterminacy. The ‘will’ here amounts to the practical 
‘commensurability’ of our knowledge of nature ‘with the human point of view’ (see Immanuel Kant, Critique 
of Judgement, trans. Werner Pluhar, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987, p. 286; 
Ak 403). Aesthetic judgment reveals the indeterminacy of these sources either in the sense of the prehistory of 
consciousness, or in terms of the planet’s geological past, which Schelling described as “the deepest of what 
remains if everything accidental and everything that has become is removed” (AW 31). The aesthetic 
cognition of beauty points to this absolute but indeterminate source. The recourse to the element of beauty 
aims to re-channel the ideal activity of reason toward the realization of, what Schelling outlined in his fierce 
polemic against Fichte, the ‘collapse of the world with the world of nature’. In the Statement on the True 
Relationship of the Philosophy of Nature to the Revised Fichtean Doctrine, Schelling lays out his program for 
Naturephilosophy: “We proceed therefore with the idea of the philosophy of nature not just beyond mere 
thinking to knowledge, but rather also beyond knowledge in general another step further, to the intuition 
/of reality and the complete collapse of the world known by us with the world of nature. Only at that point 
where the ideal has become real, the world of thought [has become] the world of nature, only at this point 
lies the last, the highest satisfaction and reconciliation of knowledge, as the fulfillment of the ethical 
requirements is only reached when they no longer appear to us as thoughts, for example, as commandments, 
but rather have become realities in the nature of our soul” (STR 30).  
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entire time,” 24 past and future, at every single instance of it being time at present. 
In this sense, the ‘entire time’ emerges “from and within the present” (RN 273). It is 
to this extent that the barbaric principle is a form of ‘weaponizing’ our 
understanding of “the deep past.”25 The past is the deep anchor of present and 
future, that which as “a real beginning, does not need to wait for it to run its 
course, but rather it must be past from the very start” (ibid.).  
The Anthropocene reveals this inevitability. The past does not have to run its 
course in order to be recognized later as a ‘had-been’ temporal stage since as past 
it is co-present with the present, which is the future of the past. In this sense, the 
Anthropocene presupposes the entire temporal stage of the co-evolution of time 
scales in terms of the appearance of disappearance, an arche-trace, like a world line 
that an object traces in four-dimensional spacetime, or rather, the 
undifferentiated whole “[representing] the sequence of events that ‘it occupies’ 
during its lifetime.”26 To this extent, the past makes itself evident through its self-
presentation of the vanishing phenomenon of the ‘had-been’, i.e., in the present. 
The past runs its course, not in the past. Rather, the past becomes past as it traces 
its life in the present. The past will look different if one gazes at it from a two or 
three-dimensional spacetime where space and time are given as absolute, “a fixed 
god-given background for all physical processes” (GR 3).  
In four-dimensional spacetime, for instance, Timothy Morton can allude to 
the past as a trace line, such as the movement of “hyperobjects,” or objects “time-
stretched to such a vast extent that they become almost impossible to hold in 
mind.”27 Oil, which runs the global world order, is a good example of a 
hyperobject: “Oil is the result of some dark, secret collusion between rocks and 
algae and plankton millions and millions of years in the past. When you look at 
oil you’re looking at the past” (PE 58). The Anthropocene can be seen in the same 
 
24 See Katie Hay, “The Role of Narration and the Overcoming of the Past in Schelling’s Ages of the World,” 
Comparative and Continental Philosophy, vol. 8, no. 3, 2016, p. 273. Henceforth cited as RN. 
25 Ben Woodard, “The Untimely and (Unshapely) Decomposition of Onto-Epistemological Solidity: 
Negarestani’s Cyclonopedia as Metaphysics,” in Leper Creativity: Cyclonopedia Symposium, ed. by Ed Keller, Nicola 
Masciandaro, and Eugene Thacker, New York: Punctum Books, 2012, p. 216. 
26 See Malcolm Ludvigsen, General Relativity: A Geometric Approach, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004, p. 3. Henceforth, GR. 
27 Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology After the End of the World, Minneapolis and London, 
University of Minnesota Press, 2013, p. 58. Henceforth cited as PE. 
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light, the past making itself the future (present). In an essay discussing the relation 
of the Earth’s petroleum deposits to the “compression-deformation effect of oil,”28 
such as carbonized plastic, Benjamin Bratton presents this evidence of the past 
like a ‘world line’, as follows: 
The Anthropocene Age of Plastic is but an instant whereby the cumulative 
subterranean mineral corpse of the planet’s initial millions of years of life, now 
rendered into mineral gas and fluid by the Earth itself, is given another zombie life 
in the animated forms of worldly Plastic: oceans of plankton resur-resurrected (sic) 
as skyscrapers, trillions of trees haunting the world as textiles, as food additives, 
artificial hearts, and even as fake plastic trees spinning in circles through the Pacific 
garbage gyre... The Anthropocene spasm of transposing the past into the generic 
chemicals we call Plastic is the Earth re-eating itself all in one go, consuming the 
full archive in one momentary spasm. In this, the animal becomes mineral. (RE 49-
50) 
For all we know, the Anthropocene is a real Lovecraftian Cthulhu,29 a 
sedentary nomad from time immemorial, if not, down to its most literal sense, 
conceived according to its Earthly source, i.e. tautegorically, a “sentient entity” 
called ‘Petroleum’ – a narrative told from “the nethermost point of view.”30 There 
are other examples of unconscious deep past. The revolt of the Earth against the 
Sun, to put it oddly, for instance, is a long deep story from the past which 
possesses a tautegorical property of a hyperstitional narrative. Reza Negarestani 
captures this point in the following passages in Cyclonopedia: Complicity with 
Anonymous Materials: 
[T]rapping the energy of the sun accumulated in organisms by means of lithologic 
sedimentation, stratification, anaerobic decay and bacteria in highly stratified 
sedimentary basins ... petroleum ... plays the role of the alpha-mutineer in Tellurian 
 
28 Benjamin Bratton, “Root the Earth: On Peak Oil Apophenia,” in Leper Creativity: Cyclonopedia Symposium, 
p. 47. Henceforth cited as RE. 
29 The Cthulhu myth was popularized by H.P. Lovecraft, an American writer of weird or speculative fiction. 
The myth is a favorite linguistic and rhetorical trope of the contemporary philosophical movement known 
as speculative realism.  See H.P. Lovecraft, Tales of the Cthulhu Mythos, New York, Random House Publishing, 
2011.  
30 See Kate Marshall, “Cyclonopedia as Novel (a meditation on complicity as inauthenticity),” in Leper 
Creativity: Cyclonopedia Symposium, p. 155. 
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insurgency against solar capitalism and its neo-Ptolemaic heliocentrism.31 
But this geo-trauma, a Tellurian myth of pre-Earthly formation, had no 
people to speak its language, only the elemental pre-bacterial actant-inhabitants 
of the first billion years before the planet formation. Mankind is the inheritor of 
this deep unconscious myth, what Schelling would describe as, “[t]he deepest, 
and therefore the lowest, that is posited out of the unspeakable … that force of 
the beginning that draws the being to or into itself and pushes it back into 
concealment” (AW 30). Over time, however, this being called Man, the being of 
modern reason, has learned to become indifferent to geo-trauma, the planetary 
distress of having to live through an inevitable Tellurian fate. There are many 
kinds of this Man who resist being placed in darkness. Joseph Masco tells us, for 
instance, of these types of men as technoscientific Tellurian collaborators of the 
solar blackmail who had greatly contributed to our present ecological 
predicament: 
November 1, 1952, is the date on which the first thermonuclear explosion, known 
as Ivy-Mike, was detonated by the United States at Eniwetok atoll. Designed by 
Edward Teller and Stanislaw Ulam, it produced a ten-megaton detonation that 
created a mushroom cloud 25 miles high and 100 miles wide. The fallout from Ivy-
Mike circled the globe and remains so comprehensive it can serve today as the key 
illustration of planetary-scale industrial effects. This explosion is now part of a 
nested series of temporalities: it is the start of a thermonuclear age inside an already 
established atomic age, a key moment in the Cold War, now poised to be the anchor 
for a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene.32 
Ivy-Mike is an example of Man’s resistance to solar hegemony. By showing off 
his capability to replicate a mini-solar energy in action, Man proves he is only 
indebted to himself. But his greatest resistance is something else entirely. His 
calculated accommodation of heat-death through oil consumption is a 
paradoxical defiant adaptation to solar hegemony. Subsequently, even this form 
of consumption would express itself in a subsidiary myth of fossil fuels, that is to 
 
31 Reza Negarestani, Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials, Melbourne: re.press, 2008, pp. 19-20. 
Henceforth cited as CC. 
32 Joseph Masco, “The Age of (a) Man,” in Future Remains: A Cabinet of Curiosities for the Anthropocene, ed. Gregg 
Mitman, Marco Armiero, Robert S. Emmett, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 2018, 
p. 48. Henceforth cited as AM. 
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say, in the form of the “exhaustion of the earth’s energy” consummating in “oil 
depletion scenarios” (CC 28). As per Negarestani’s Cyclonopedia, this myth 
conditions, among others, “[t]he policy of underdevelopment and deliberate 
impoverishment bound to the exhaustibility of oil fields: since oil is dying we must 
use it wisely and calculatedly (the fallacy of prudent poverty)” (ibid., p. 27). This 
logic of fossil fuel depletion commands an anthropogenic myth that has 
planetary-wide, ecological consequences extending to another auxilliary myth, 
“the exhaustion of the Earth’s aqua vitae” (ibid.), a myth of saturation that prepares 
the planet for the return to the desert – the surface skin of oil. A scientific report 
provides this myth with concrete empirical supplement: “About 22% of 
recognized marine fisheries are overexploited or already depleted, and 44% more 
are at their limit of exploitation.”33 Elizabeth Povinelli extends this point beyond 
the boundaries of the Anthropocene: “[I]t is hard not to be seduced by the figure 
of the Desert, not to imagine that the Anthropocene, the geological age of the 
Human Being, will be the last age of humans and the first stage of Earth 
becoming Mars, a planet once awash in life, but now a dead orb hanging in the 
night sky.”34 In general, these hyperstitional narratives of the Tellurian myth of 
‘Man’, with empirical supplementation that bolsters its economic telos from the 
loss of ecosystems and biodiversity, derive their early reference from a quasi-
Bataillean ‘general solution to the problem of consumption’: 
Life appears as a pause on the energy path; as a precarious stabilization and 
complication of solar decay. It is most basically comprehensible as the general solution 
to the problem of  consumption. Such a solar- or general-economic perspective exhibits 
production as an illusion; the hypostatization of a digression in consumption. To 
produce is to partially manage the release of energy into its loss, and nothing 
more.35  
The calculated expenditure of energy reserves, under the pretext of ‘prudent 
poverty’, thus becomes a form of “abstract resistance to loss” (TA xviii). This explains 
 
33 Will Steffen, et. al, “Executive Summary: Global Change and the Earth System: A Planet Under 
Pressure,” IGBP, Stockholm, Sweden, International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme, 2004, p. 14. 
34 Elizabeth Povinelli, Geontologies: A Requiem to Later Liberalism, Durham and London, Duke 
University Press, 2016, p. 36. 
35 Nick Land, The Thirst for Annihilation: George Bataille and Virulent Nihilism, London and New York: Routledge, 
1992, p. xviii. Henceforth cited as TA. 
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the rabid consumerism of the Earth’s human inhabitants, coordinated by the 
singular myth-making power of ‘Man’ who is, by all means, the Man of the 
OECD sphere with its main headquarters in France.36 In a recent report in the 
Anthropocene Review, the ‘Man’ behind the myth-making Tellurian machine of 
optimizing capital’s resistance to exhausting supply has so far gained the highest 
returns for its abstract resistance to loss: “In 2010 the OECD countries accounted for 
74% of global GDP but only 18% of the global population. Insofar as the imprint 
on the Earth System scales with consumption, most of the human imprint on the 
Earth System is coming from the OECD world.”37 
Here we are more intent to resolve the Anthropocene as a boundary concept 
between organic humanity and Man, between the rest of humanity and the myth-
makers of abstract loss. No less than a replication of the dual extensity of the 
organism in relation to an absolute life source, humanity holds a double extensity 
relation to a nature that is merely ‘made up’, manufactured out of abstract loss. 
First, it was an abstract resistance to loss, but since the object of protestation must 
be as abstract as the non-resistance to the real phenomenon of fanatical 
consumerism fueling the myth of energy depletion, the loss follows the law of 
indetermination – the loss, as abstract, must be made determinate and concrete. 
This is the heart and soul of the myth – to turn actuality into possibility, to turn 
energy into an abstract, nay, determinable possibility of expenditure, according 
to calculated risks.  
THE MYTH OF DUAL EXTENSITY 
Humanity is the collective representation of these calculated risks, not Man. 
According to the principle of abstract resistance to loss, ‘Man’ loses nothing in 
abstraction. Echoing Heidegger’s prognosis, in his treatise on Schelling, it is the 
rest of humanity that is made to become subservient to “an uncomprehended 
 
36 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development whose member countries are highly developed nations, 
most of them from Europe. 
37 See Will Steffen, Wendy Broadgate, Lisa Deutsch, Owen Gaffney, and Cornelia Ludwig, “The trajectory 
of the Anthropocene: The Great Acceleration,” The Anthropocene Review, vol. 2., no. 1, 2015, p. 91. Henceforth, 
GA. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 334 
 
present”38 toward which, as humanity and as subjects of “the calculating game 
between origin and future” (SE 168) which conditions the Telluric production of 
myths, peoples have every right to respond by actual resistance to expenditure, 
for instance, against a prudent version of global inequality, which, unfortunately, 
keeps the myth stable. In order to make the present understandable one has to 
manufacture it, such as today’s global inequality, according to the law of 
indetermination. The Anthropocene must stick to the logic of abstract resistance 
to loss in order that its prediction comes true, the total depletion of energy supply, 
i.e., the total abstract realization of  the myth. Truth is, it has happened already.  
One scientific report concludes: “Will the next 50 years bring the Great 
Decoupling39 or the Great Collapse? The latest 10 years of the Great Acceleration 
graphs show signs of both but cannot distinguish between these scenarios, or 
other possibilities. But 100 years on from the advent of the Great Acceleration, in 
2050, we’ll almost certainly know the answer” (GA 94.). The scary prognosis is 
that humanity is headed to an inevitable phase of extinction events of which 
climate change plays a critical geological role. To this extent, it pays to continue 
to look at Heidegger’s seminar on Schelling. For Heidegger, the principle of 
indetermination is deemed dishonest from the start: the determinability of the 
abstract begins with “[calculating] in [the past] what is necessary for the present 
and make it compatible with the present” (SE 167). Even here the present is not 
known, uncomprehended. This is how the sublation of indetermination into 
determinateness happens - the total realization of abstraction from the usual form 
of time reckoning. In the meantime, ‘Man’ says it’s business as usual, an 
anthropogenic approach that, as Ian Angus argues, ‘catapults’ itself, not without 
calculation, “into a new ecological phase—one less conducive to maintaining 
biological diversity and a stable human civilization.”40 It is Man’s business to keep 
the rest of humanity oblivious to the myth of the present.  
Ultimately, the myth of dual extensity (that replaces the original boundary of 
two worlds, which, as Schelling earlier argued, ‘cannot be cancelled’) follows the 
 
38 Martin Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Ohio: Ohio 
University Press, 1985, p. 168. Hereafter cited as SE. 
39 Or, ‘decoupling development from environmental impacts” (GA 94). 
40 Ian Angus, Facing the Anthropocene: Fossil Capitalism and the Rise of the Earth System, New York, Monthly Review 
Press, 2016, p. 14. 
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abstract resistance to loss – the rest of organic humanity is snatched from a 
manufactured nature, a nature created by advanced countries in the world. This 
is the first artificial dual extensity. The effect is quite stunning: the rest of humanity 
is made external to ‘Man’. Under this extensity scheme, the Earth becomes a 
degenerate whole with which one can no longer wish to be united in which every 
‘becoming’ is an exhaustive willing and striving. The three ‘plenary boundaries’ 
that have already been crossed by ‘humanity’ is a stark indication that the dual 
external world has been successfully replaced by boundaries it is compelled to 
cross. All these boundaries are created by a manufactured version of nature in 
which consumption is the real driver of planetary collapse. The rest of humanity 
is doubly separated from nature, from nature that it is generically split into 
production and product by long cosmic and terrestrial history of evolution, and 
from a ‘made up’ one – the notion of an environed planet. The second extensity 
is only possible under certain conditions where nature is successfully reduced to 
an object to be manufactured, repeatedly. As an environed planet, the Earth is held 
as a permanent object in which nature’s inhibited evolution is cybernetically 
transformed into a fixed point, as a fixed limitation of nature’s activity.  
The transformation of the planet into a system as a cybernetic process rests 
on successful transformation of the planet into an object, a planet modified into 
a single living infrastructure, a safe operating space, until it is not a planet 
anymore. It ceases to be a planet and becomes an ‘Earth system’. But even this 
system is an outcome of a forced dual extensity; it has lost its natural substrate to 
which the rest of humanity relates also externally, i.e., the second dual extensity 
under the mythic principle of indetermination. Under this principle, the planet is 
snatched from its natural activity in order to fill out a cybernetic equation (i.e., 
‘compromised’ natural equation), such as described by Schellnhuber and Kropp, 
in the sense of the “co-evolution between N (ecosphere) and A (anthrosphere), 
where the ecosphere is the environment and the anthroposphere is the human 
world and society.”41 Schellnhuber and Kropp coined the term geocybernetics to 
mean “the art of adequately controlling the complex dynamic earth system under 
 
41 See Jason Philipps, “The conceptual development of a geocybernetic relationship between sustainable 
development and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA),” Applied Geography, vol. 31, p. 971. Henceforth 
cited as CG. 
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uncertainties of all kinds.”42 The ‘art’, once touted as the second Copernican 
revolution, does not, however, include the source of the myth of indetermination, 
the lie of global inequality, which makes this beautiful eco-anthropospheric, post-
Telluric, equation, susceptible to participate in, all the more so condone the 
forcing of dual extensity in the name of Man.  
The loss of the Earth as a natural substrate of intelligence and spirit, or reason 
itself, is one of the chief consequences of the Anthropocene – the Earth has 
vanished into the logic of “prudent and effective use of resources … at all spatial 
and temporal scales” (CG 971). But it has vanished in proportion to the intensive 
call to renew oneness with what is called the ‘Earth system’, which can now, at 
last, be studied as a hypothesis by climatologists, environmentalists, ecologists, 
etc. In his contention against Fichte, Schelling laments a presentation of nature 
that is as much ‘unholy’ as ‘ungodly’, “in every respect finite and completely 
dead.”43 As Schelling would sarcastically quote Fichte’s own words, “The divine 
life remains life even in the presentation. This living and visible manifestation we 
call the human race. Thus the human race is all there is” (STR 6). As soon as the 
Earth becomes a finite object of study, it loses its essence as in-finite, as a finite 
organization of an absolute activity that is infinite from its point of origination. 
This is necessary to attain knowledge, for the Earth to vanish from the universe 
of finite organizations in the Milky Way in order to become an objective world 
for knowledge, but also, as a dead planet. The purpose of this death sentence is 
more than philosophical – it is vanity:  the Earth is “allowed to come alive 
through the rational life and be a product of its power and effectiveness” (STR 
67). Assuming technoscientific rationality succeeds in the future in transforming 
the Earth into a dynamic image of  itself, it will be for the first time that empirical 
subjectivity, or the largest of all, ‘Man’, has become a planet of its own. It will be 
for the first time that creation becomes non-divine, ungodly, and absolutely finite.  
What is at stake if the Earth becomes absolutely finite? The answer is 
intuitively obvious: Everything becomes reducible to a doctrine, a system, devoid 
of an infinite substrate (Nature) whose function is to provide a ground for 
 
42 H.J. Schellnhuber and J. Kropp, “Geocybernetics: Controlling a Complex Dynamical System Under 
Uncertainty,” Naturwissenschaftten Review Articles, vol. 85, 1998, p. 411. 
43 Cited by Snow, “Translator’s Introduction,” in STR, p. xii. 
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individuation so that subjectivity does not only possess an empirical but also 
transcendental property in terms of co-individuation with other subjectivities – 
overall, the mystery of nature that is capable of averting nihilism and fatalism. 
Give up this ground and an absolute war erupts, a war without stake! Such Earth 
is not capable of averting the degeneration process of self-termination the 
moment it self-generates, or paradoxically speaking, the moment it natures itself.  
The second dual extensity, lest we forget, is that the rest of humanity is made 
extrinsic, not only to this very same naturing principle, the saga of naturing 
capital accumulation (which explains the perfect correlation of abstraction of loss 
and the empirical gain of resisting a loss), but also to itself as an externalized 
human mass, incapable of resistance against solar capitalism. Resistance, as 
Negarestani’s Cyclonopedia contends, is futile for “capitalism is not a human 
symptom but rather a planetary inevitability … [C]apitalism was here before 
human existence, waiting for a host” (CC 27).  
THE ANTHROPOCENE AS THE INEXISTENT PROBLEM OF THE EARTH 
The dual extensity that the Anthropocene has replaced with planetary 
boundaries is an original description of how nature, in the Spinozist sense of 
natura naturans, excludes the human point of view, under its own principle and 
beyond anthropic approximations or representations of the inhibited point of 
Nature’s activity. The Earth is this inhibited point whose relation to its source, 
i.e., nature as infinite activity (in terms of evolution), is always defined by, what 
Grant calls, for instance, the extainment of infinity. Following Schelling’s lead, 
this extainment, Grant argues, “makes possible the abyss [Abgrund] of not-being 
in the other.”44 In the present case, Nature not-being in the Earth.  
 The Anthropocene, however, is more than a description of how nature 
operates and permits a kind of “double non-containment, or mutual extainment 
(Ausschließung),” between Nature and the Earth in terms of the idea as speculative 
attractor that forges in its contemporary anthropogenic language the whole 
“reciprocal extainment of clashing infinites” (LI 6). These infinites, i.e. Nature 
and its product (the Earth) clash on account of the idea’s thinking of existent (an 
 
44 Iain Hamilton Grant, ‘Law of Insuperable Environment: What is Exhibited in the Exhibition of the Process 
of Nature?” Analecta Hermeneutica, vol. 5, 2013, p. 6. Henceforth, LI. 
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approximation of the inexistent that is Nature), on the one hand, and Nature 
extaining or excluding the ideal grounding from the actual extainment process, 
on the other hand (ibid.).45 In the absence of the idea, Nature and the Earth have 
clashed many times, the history of which (the ancestrality that precedes the 
relation between the two) is necessarily contained in the present idea’s thinking of 
the whole infinity of nature, which no idea or intelligence can, however, 
completely comprehend as a whole-in-itself. Suffice it to say, nature’s inexistence 
is not due to nature, but rather, on account of the contingencies of human 
knowing. Here then, in the idea, nature shows its extainment in its most 
catastrophic form, as Grant formulates as follows: “If nature exists, it is in 
consequence of that nature that being becomes a catastrophic environment for it, 
the catastrophe of its ineliminable, environing inexistence” (ibid.) 
The Anthropocene is an anthropogenic anomaly that impinges on this 
‘double non-containment’. Through its notorious propensity for over-production 
and over-consumption, it exceeds the mutual extainment in the sense that it is in 
over-production and over-consumption that the ineliminable inexistence of 
nature is resolved into a problem of waste management. It compels nature to 
manifest its ineliminable ‘nature’, its naturing nature, in terms of the “arbitrariness 
of [its] deathly management of decomposition,”46 and then allocates this 
exhibition of death to risks that can be scaled across the geo-biosphere, the 
anthrosphere and the ecosphere, all for “prudent and effective use of resources” 
(CG 971). By forcing nature to exhibit its way with managing decomposition in 
the most radical catastrophic terms, by polluting it, the Earth has become an 
independent system of its own. Not since this deathly management of decay and 
waste has the Earth become a scientific, cybernetic system. In this sense, the once 
normative status of nature can no longer afford us an idea, a ‘point-attractor, 
 
45 In his footnote discussion, Grant describes the concept of extainment: “Extainment’ (symbolised as ><) 
is the topological contrary of “containment” (<>). Both are conjunctive (that is, one extainment can extain 
or be extained by another, just as one containment can be contained by or contain another) and co-
implying, since the containment of containment entails that the contained is extained from the container” 
(ibid.., n. 21). 
46 F.W.J. Schelling, “On the World Soul: A Hypothesis of Higher Physics for Explaining Universal 
Organism/Treatise on the Relation Between the Real and the Ideal in Nature of the Development of first 
Principle of Naturephilosophy in the Principles of Gravity and Light,” Iain Hamilton Grant, in Collapse VI, 
ed. by Robin Mackay, Falmouth, Urbanomic, 2010), p. 68.  
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which can yield a figure of nature as sacred. In this light, the perversion of the 
new point-attractor, the Anthropocene, makes the idealist goal of the 
presentation of nature appear, at this stage, already nostalgic of the pre-
anthropogenic past. Grant outlines this idealistic goal as follows:  
The incipient field for the exhibition of the natural process is ... precisely that 
thinking insofar as it thinks what is, i.e., thinks consequently upon the subject of 
existence. Rather than confirming its givenness to the idea, this thinking entails the 
thinking of that subject’s inexistence, the environment extaining its actuality. (LI 6) 
Unfortunately, there is no longer an incipient field for nature presentation; it 
has virtually become an irreducible field of objects in which nature is prohibited 
to present itself as subject. But if this could also be an instance of nature’s 
extainment of the Earth, through the idea that presents nature rather negatively, 
not to mention dangerously, the Anthropocene, despite its one-sidedness, may 
also qualify as indifference to permanence, thus in a way agreeing with the 
‘indwelling logic’ of nature’s indifference, for instance, to subject and object. This 
is a paradoxical relation that entertains no certainty. As Grant would later argue, 
“[t]he “indwelling logic of nature consists … not in a system already formed and 
awaiting content, but one in the process of formation that must begin with a mark 
in the void it can never recover” (HNL 494). 
Overall, the Anthropocene points to the inexistent problem of the Earth that, 
here on earth, is showing signs of incapability to provide an ‘incipient field of 
thinking’. It is fundamentally a problem of ethical grounding, but ‘inexistence’ has 
never entered our moral universe yet, especially in light of the false accordance 
of nature and mind that has become the epitome of the anthropogenic era of 
carbon-based climate change. Schelling took pains to convey this ethical 
grounding in a philosophical syntax that he felt would be understandable in his 
time. He would try, most controversially, in his treatise on Freedom where the 
problem could be brought closer to the most cherished complement of nature’s 
self-creation, its co-emergence with the will. By arguing for its true co-emergence 
with nature, Schelling proposed a concept of freedom that could be protected 
against the subjective idealism of his time, least to say, its outlandish manner of 
absolving necessity (as if the ego holds the power of forgiveness) for the apparent 
crime of necessity, of putting Man at the receiving end of cosmic knowledge, 
always the end-user of a whimsical trajectory of the production of universal light 
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that necessity, from some eternal point, could, by fiat, exclude from its circle of 
obligation to enlighten or feed with signs to interpret. This is the precise context 
in which Schelling extended his earlier formulation (in the System of  Transcendental 
Idealism of  1800) of a concept of freedom that co-emerges with nature.47 This 
concept of freedom ought to be immune from the exorbitant claim of the will, 
prevalent in the negative philosophy of Schelling’s time, which continues even 
today, namely that there is an outside world to which freedom relates by 
reflection, by virtue of which the ‘world’ is relegated to an exterior dimension 
where it will be left fighting for its own place to express. 
Humankind would continue to look at the exterior, a ‘spatial negative space’, 
as something to be tamed, known for its signature propensity for chaos and 
rupture. As Gilles Châtelet describes this space, this “spatial negativity [was] too 
neglected by the history of philosophy (especially in its concern with the work of 
the negative in a perspective of temporality and historicity).”48 It may be for this 
self-complacency and arrogance that have crossed three planetary boundaries so 
far that the Earth has entered a domain from which it may no longer recover (PB 
32). Not that Nature is avenging herself, but that since she co-originates with the 
will, nature is there for the will as her catastrophic ‘environing inexistence,’ which 
is a reminder to the latter that their co-origination is irreversible, a fait accompli.   
This co-origination, unfortunately, as Schelling would assert in the Freedom 
essay, “contains a typology [Vorbilder] that no man has yet interpreted.”49 And 
as Paul de Man would interpolate us here, this figure of ‘Man’ is precisely an 
effect of a failure to interpret, a failure to read the sublime.50 A known expositor 
of de Man’s ideas, Claire Colebrook argues: “Such a sublime would be … a mode 
of seeing without sense or teleology.”51 In Schellingian terms, this mode of seeing 
 
47 F.W.J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. Peter Health, Charlottesville, University Press of 
Virginia, 2001, p. 235. Henceforth, STI. 
48 Gilles Châtelet, Figuring Space, trans. Robert Shore and Muriel Zagha, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic 
Publishing, Inc., 2000, p. 13. 
49 F.W.J. Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Jeff Love and Johannes 
Schmidt, New York: State University of New York Press, Albany, 2006, p. 77. Henceforth, PHF. 
50 See Paul de Man, Resistance to Theory, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1986, p. 
13. 
51 Claire Colebrook “What is Anthropo-Political?” in Tom Cohen, Claire Colebrook, and J. Hillis Miller, 
Twilight of the Anthropocene Idols, London, Open Humanities Press, 2016, 120.  
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will be devoid of the teleology of the idea of ‘Man’, a kind of ‘incipient field of 
thinking’; a mode of embracing a new conception of the future, and thus, a new 
Being. This way the ‘scandal of Naturphilosophie’ is revived.  
In the concluding section that follows, I would like to return to the discussion 
of this scandal, as briefly as possible, vis-à-vis Hegel’s rendition of nature’s 
sublation. Notwithstanding its actual resonance is oblique, and therefore, cannot 
be absolutely tended as unequivocal in relation to our current ecological 
predicament, Hegel’s logical system arguably leans on the side of the debate that 
endorses a dangerous concept of ‘absolute coincidence’ of nature and intelligence. 
Schelling would rather give his backing to the concept of ‘co-origination’, no 
matter how regressively pantheist it may sound, which is different from ‘absolute 
coincidence’. This absolute coincidence is emphatically idealized in the present 
technoscientific alternatives to climate collapse.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Though Schelling rejects sublation as a method of deduction, he did not 
intend to mean that, in contrast to the mediation of logical synthesis, a kind of 
permanent unsublated ground ought to turn the whole work of philosophy into a 
kind of Platonic anamnesis which, as Schelling tells us, “is more of a striving toward 
knowledge than knowledge itself (AW xxxvii). Schelling is critiquing the Hegelian 
conception of negativity for which the full extent of dialectical logic is employed, 
that because nature is an in-itself that approaches the supersensible, the last 
option is to expand the bounds of the knowable to historical temporality (a step 
beyond Kant’s recourse to morals) outside of which, where nature assumes the 
place or the realm of the dark principle, the supersensible, the processes of 
mediation, however, cease to apply. Schelling adds: “Without this preceding 
darkness creatures have no reality; darkness is their necessary inheritance (PHF 
29).”  
But while denying the possibility of an unsublated past, Hegel’s Aufhebung is 
also the most ironically transparent manner of recollecting what had been denied 
of transparency. The equivalent of this recollection in Hegel is the act of “simple 
exposition of what alone first belongs to this simplest of all simples, the logical 
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beginning.”52 Arguably, Hegel reveals this ‘denial of natural beginning’, which is 
the beginning of logic, in the passages that follow: 
The beginning must then be absolute or, what means the same here, must be an 
abstract beginning; and so there is nothing that it may presuppose, must not be 
mediated by anything or have a ground, ought to be rather itself the ground of the 
entire science. It must therefore be simply an immediacy, or rather only 
immediacy itself. Just as it cannot have any determination with respect to an other, 
so too it cannot have any within; it cannot have any content, for any content would 
entail distinction and the reference of distinct moments to each other, and hence a 
mediation. The beginning is therefore pure being. (SL 48)  
Here the logical sublation of the ungrounded promotes a conception of 
history that repeats itself in ever-diversifying forms in the extent to which the 
logical determinateness of Aufhebung, within a particular period, encounters new 
inflections (of the same universal, to begin with) derived from the contingency of 
the times, which, however, do not change their relation to the infinite universal 
as the development of negativity implicit in it.53 Everything is already sublated 
beforehand.54 Hegel emphatically argues for this kind of logical finality that 
establishes the content of science: “In this advance the beginning thus loses the 
one-sidedness that it has when determined simply as something immediate and 
abstract; it becomes mediated, and the line of scientific forward movement 
consequently turns into a circle. – It also follows that what constitutes the beginning, 
because it is something still undeveloped and empty of content, is not yet truly 
known at that beginning, and that only science, and science fully developed, is 
the completed cognition of it, replete with content and finally truly grounded” 
(SL 49). What the dialectic neglects is the fact that there is the unsublated from 
the start which is the proto-transcendental possibility of logical determinations. 
This ‘proto-transcendental’ is ‘natural’ in all its sense. Schelling’s approach to the 
transcendental is already evident in the 1800 System: the transcendental must 
 
52 See G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. George Di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010,  p. 48. Henceforth, SL.  
53 Hegel summarizes this point as follows: “The advance does not consist in the derivation of an other, or in 
the transition to a truly other: inasmuch as there is a transition, it is equally sublated again. Thus the 
beginning of philosophy is the ever present and self-preserving foundation of all subsequent developments, 
remaining everywhere immanent in its further determinations” (SL 49). 
54 See Wirth, “Notes on Translator’s Introduction,” in Ages, p. 134, n. 15. 
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‘annex ‘the material to the formal’ in order to ‘materialize the laws of the mind 
into laws of nature’ which echoes his earlier formulation in the Ideas: “[W]hat we 
want is not that Nature should coincide with the laws of our mind by chance ... 
but that she herself, necessarily and originally, should not only express, but even 
realize, the laws of our mind.”55 As Gare puts it in relation to Schelling’s notion 
of the transcendental: “Nature must be seen as capable of organizing itself, 
generating life and the human consciousness capable of knowing nature.”56 
For Hegel, it is not “the fault of understanding if there is no further advance” 
(SL 540) in reasoning or knowledge, or science in general. Rather, the fault is 
derivative of impotent nature. According to Hegel, due to “the impotence of 
nature” which reflects its inability to exhibit “the logical forms in their purity,57 it 
is only the understanding that can accord nature “the rigidity of being” (ibid., p. 
539). Notice here that the understanding can only give Nature a being deserving 
of it, namely, a rigid, lifeless being, inasmuch as nature, according to Hegel, is 
merely a source of wonder, but wonder is itself “without concept and its object is 
the irrational” (SL 536). In this sense, Hegel’s postulate of nature is that nature is 
nature because “it is allowed to nature (ibid.),” needless to say, by the spirit, vis-à-
vis Schelling’s postulate that if “left to itself, nature would still lead everything 
back to a state of utter negation” (AW 31). For Schelling, there is always “the 
constant tendency” in nature to ‘restrict’ cognition and “to place [it] in darkness” 
(ibid.)  
Not unexpectedly, this natural restriction is directed against the 
‘comprehension of existence’ that tends to view nature as incapable of 
consciousness, incapable of the spirit that is essential to resolve the “disparity 
between the ‘I’ and its object,” and to settle the problem of difference as a 
problem of the “disparity of the substance with itself ” (PS 21). Hegel provides the 
finishing touches to the ‘phenomenology of spirit’ that provides us, among others, 
 
55 F.W.J. Schelling, Ideas for A Philosophy of Nature, trans. Errol E. Harris and Peter Heath, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 42-43.  
56 See Arran Gare, “From Kant to Schelling to Process Metaphysics,” in Cosmos and History: The Journal of 
Natural and Social Philosophy, vol. 7, 2, 2011, p. 29.  
57G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopedia Logic with Zusatse, Part I of the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, trans. by 
T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris, Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, Company, 
Inc., 1991, p. 61. 
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a framework for interpreting the Anthropocene according to the most dominant 
form of nature presentation today: “Thus what seems to happen outside of it, to 
be an activity directed against it, is really its own doing, and Substance shows 
itself to be essentially Subject” (ibid.). This is a good example of ethical realism, 
but its philosophical direction may also grant permission, or allow a regression to 
subjective idealism. Because existence is now mediated by the subject that calls 
itself substance by virtue of its having become ‘self-like’ in regard to the dialectical 
relation between the ‘I’ and its object, what can happen next is the deepening of 
this subjective experience and the suspension of the ‘outside’ which, though from 
here it has to be viewed as an “immediate property of the ‘I’ (ibid.),” does not, 
however, totally absolve itself of its independent existence. This is the ‘barbaric’ 
side of the outside, as Schelling puts it, which necessarily “drives” the subject or 
substance “out of the world of phenomena into the world of ideas.”58  In the world 
of ideas, nature can only be viewed as extrinsic to the human point of view, and 
thus determinable by knowledge and science. In this dialectical relation, 
knowledge cannot be determinable by the former. Apparently, nature does not 
think. It thus necessarily produces a strict correlation between subject and object 
from the standpoint of the subject which is, however, also restricted to thinking 
the correlation and no more.59  
If so, then thinking itself, which by virtue of its own doing views the outside 
as ‘directed against it’, is also necessarily restricted to a self-positing loop. But this 
does not change the fact that thinking co-originates with nature, in that nature 
gives back what the subject or substance posits on its behalf in the realm of ideas, 
that is to say, it returns to thinking in the “greatest dominion of forms” (OWS 68). 
As Schelling argues in one of his most neglected essays, which we are here quoting 
again, nature returns to thinking with the “arbitrariness of the deathly management 
 
58 F.W.J. Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, trans. trans. by Douglas W. Stott, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1989, p. 89.  
59 This point is argued by Meillassoux in a similar work: “Correlationism consists in disqualifying the claim 
that it is possible to consider the realms of subjectivity and objectivity independently of one another. Not 
only does it become necessary to insist that we never grasp an object ‘in itself’, in isolation from its relation 
to the subject, but it also becomes necessary to maintain that we can never grasp a subject that would not 
always-already be related to an object” (Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of 
Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier, London: Continuum, 2008, p. 5).  
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of decomposition” (ibid.). This return, which is in a way reactive of thought’s exilic 
overindulgence in the ideas, comes with huge humanitarian costs, that is to say, 
as experienced in the world of phenomena. In conclusion, it is in this sense that 
an absolute coincidence between nature and mind, which is ideally expressed in 
the anthropogenic takeover of dual extensity, ought to be disengaged from its 
irresponsible form in absolute idealism in favor of the mutual indifference of 
nature and the organism.  
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